player roles: "Suppose that Alice is a careful, prudent person, and in the absence of an agreement, would play d. Suppose now that the players agree on 1c, c 2 , and each retires to his 'corner' in order actually to make a choice. Alice is about to choose c when she says to herself: 'Wait; I have a few minutes; let me think this over. Suppose that Bob doesn't trust me, and so will play d in spite of our agreement. Then he would still want me to play c, because that way he will get 8 rather than 7. And of course, also if he does play c, it is better for him that I play c. Thus he wants me to play c no matter what. […] Since he can reason in the same way as me, neither one of us gets any information from the agreement; it is as if there were no agreement. So I will choose now what I would have chosen without an agreement, namely d ' " (990, 202) . Aumann concludes that the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium 1c, c 2 is not self-enforcing.
This line of reasoning abstracts away from the possibility that Alice and Bob may have a preference against dishonesty (here, for violating an agreement). In this abstraction, Aumann is not alone. Indeed, virtually all of economics relies on the presumption that economic agents have no preference for honesty or against deceiving or lying per se. The standard assumption is that economic agents opportunistically misreport their private information whenever they believe it is to their advantage to do so. 2 We show here that "small lying costs," in the sense of a lexicographic preference for honesty-when it doesn't reduce material payoffs-render the "bad" equilibrium 1d, d 2 in the game above evolutionarily unstable under two-sided pre-play communication. While small lying costs don't eliminate all bad equilibria, they do destabilize payoff dominated equilibrium outcomes, where stability is defined in a standard evolutionary model with a set-valued notion of evolutionary stability. When applying our model to Aumann's example, we come to the conclusion that the outcome 1c, c 2 , which Aumann convincingly argues is not self-enforcing when players are indifferent toward honesty, is the only robust long-run outcome. Expressed somewhat loosely: if such a game were played with pre-play communication, over and over again in a large population with a common language and a lexicographic preference for honesty, then play of 1c, c 2 would be the only mode of behavior that would be sustainable in the long run. Even if the population were initially playing 1d, d 2 , it would eventually find its way to the payoff dominant equilibrium 1c, c 2.
More precisely, we generalize the cheap-talk approach to include what we call a meaning correspondence, a correspondence that specifies what pre-play messages mean in terms of the action to be taken in the underlying game, such as the one in (). For instance, the message "I will play c" would typically mean that the sender intends to take action c. To take any other action would be deemed dishonest. By contrast, the message "I will play c or d" is consistent with any action in the game () and is thus honest irrespective of what action the sender takes. 3 The key assumption here is that the two parties have a common language and agree on its meaning. Our analysis shows how such a shared culture-language and honesty code-facilitates coordination on socially efficient equilibrium outcomes in strategic interactions. It does not imply honesty, however. Individuals may lie in equilibrium, even when this is part of an evolutionarily stable set. It is rather the common understanding of the language-the common meaning correspondence-that drives home the result.
Most individuals arguably feel some guilt or shame when lying or being dishonest. The practice of using the polygraph in trials suggests that lying causes physiological symptoms of effort (sweating), and recent fMRI studies provide neurological evidence that lying activates more parts thE AmERicAN EcONOmic REViEW of the brain, and parts more associated with negative emotions, than truth-telling.
Uri Gneezy (2005) provides experimental evidence for a psychological cost associated with the act of lying (see also Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson 200; Sjaak Hurkens and Kartik 2006; and Tobias Lundquist et al. 2007 ). Gneezy's main empirical finding is that, "The average person prefers not to lie, when doing so only increases her payoff a little but reduces the other's payoff a great deal" (2005, 385) . In the context of the example above: for a sufficiently large psychological cost of lying, neither Alice nor Bob would say that they will play c and then play d. What happens, by contrast, if the preference for honesty is weak in comparison to the material stakes?
This is exactly what we analyze here. We go to the extreme and assume that players avoid dishonest messages only if this comes at no loss of material payoff. This assumption may, at first sight, seem too weak to have any interesting implication for behavior. However, this is not so. For example, suppose that, in Aumann's example, both Alice and Bob say that they will play c, but take action d. Such behavior is compatible with Nash equilibrium under cheap talk, since then messages have no exogenous meaning. By contrast, it is incompatible with Nash equilibrium in a lexicographic communication game if the message space is rich enough to permit precise descriptions of actions in the game. For if the language contains some message, m, which is honest only if action c is taken, and another message, m9, which is honest only when followed by action d -two innocuous assumptions about any natural language-then it is lexicographically better to say m9 instead of m, since this can induce no payoff loss in the game g in ().
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Lexicographic preferences for honesty, by themselves, imply neither honesty nor efficiency in equilibrium. In fact, we show that there are Nash equilibria in lexicographic communication games in which both players are dishonest, and we also show that there are Nash equilibria in such games that result in outcomes that are payoff dominated by other Nash equilibria in the underlying game g. However, Nash equilibria in pre-play communication games usually come in whole continuum sets, so-called equilibrium components. Our main result is that in finite and symmetric two-player n 3 n-coordination games with a unique payoff dominant equilibrium, components that yield payoff dominated outcomes are set-wise evolutionarily unstable, granted the message space satisfies two axioms-a precision and a null axiom-that are met by natural languages. The precision axiom requires that, for each action in the underlying game g, there exists a message that means that the sender intends to take precisely that action. The null axiom requires that there is a message that means that the sender may take any action. We also show that the payoff dominant Nash equilibrium outcome is evolutionarily stable. We extend our model to sender-receiver games and show that the sender's most preferred equilibrium is selected. This finding is in agreement with earlier results based on different approaches from ours.
The mechanism that drives home our inefficiency result-that inefficiency leads to evolutionary instability-is similar to that in Arthur Robson (990) in that it depends on the existence of unsent messages in equilibrium. Robson noted that, in a population playing such an equilibrium, a small group of deviating players can profitably use such messages as a "secret handshake" to recognize each other and to coordinate their play to an efficient equilibrium. However, while the existence of such unsent messages is assumed in Robson (990) , and nondeviating players in his setting are assumed not to react to these, the existence of unsent messages is derived here from primitives, and nondeviators may recognize and even "punish" senders of such messages. Frank Kozel, Tamara Padgett, and Mark S. George (200) find, "For lying, compared with telling the truth, there is more activation in the right anterior cingulate, right inferior frontal, right orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas" (855). Other studies suggest that activities in the right side of the brain are correlated with negative emotions (see, e.g., Richard J. Davidson and Kenneth Hugdahl 995) . 5 Just as with Aumann's informal reasoning, this hinges on the fact that the off-diagonal payoff 8 is no less than the on-diagonal payoff 7.
We believe that setwise evolutionary stability is relevant in the present context. If an interaction takes place over and over again in a large population with a common language and culture, then drift may occur among materially payoff equivalent strategies in connected sets.
6 Thus, if the set is evolutionarily unstable, a small group of individuals can, sooner or later, deviate to some strategy outside the set and do better in terms of material payoffs.
Our results appear to be broadly in agreement with recent empirical findings. Based on laboratory experiments, Blume and Ortmann (2007) find that, in games with payoff structures similar to that in Aumann's example, costless communication with a priori meaningful messages leads to the efficient outcome after some rounds of play. In a follow-up on Gneezy (2005) , Hurkens and Kartik (2006) find that Gneezy's data cannot reject the hypothesis that some people never lie, while others sometimes lie when they obtain a material benefit from that. In particular, an individual's propensity to lie may, within certain bounds, depend neither on the individual's material benefit, nor on the harm done to others. To us, this seems to lend some empirical support to the hypothesis maintained here of a (probably culturally conditioned) lexicographic deontological preference for honesty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section I, Nash equilibrium is analyzed in Section II and evolutionary stability in Section III. Section IV analyzes one-sided communication, Section V discusses related research and Section VI concludes. Mathematical proofs are given in an Appendix.
I. Lexicographic Communication Games
Let g be a symmetric n 3 n two-player game with payoff matrix P 5 1p 1a, b 2 2. Thus, p 1a, b 2 is the payoff to a player who uses pure strategy a when the other player uses pure strategy b. We will refer to g as the underlying game. Let A denote the finite set of pure strategies of g, to be called actions. Let m be a nonempty finite set of messages. There is no restriction on what these messages are, but we take them to be statements in a natural language (allowing for basic notation from mathematics), mastered by both persons playing the game in question, and referring to actions to be taken in the game g. The messages can be unconditional, such as "I will take action a [ A," or conditional, such as "I will take action a [ A if you say that you will take action a." 7 Let G 5 1s, v2 be a symmetric cheap-talk communication game, based on the game g, as follows. First, the players simultaneously send a message from the set m to each other. Then, each player observes both messages and takes an action a [ A. The pure-strategy set for each player in G is thus the finite set s of pairs 1m, f 2 , where m [ m is a message to send and f : m 2 S A a function or "rule" that specifies what action a 5 f 1m, m92 in game g to take after having sent message m and having received message m9, for all possible message pairs 1m, m92.
8 Given a mixed strategy s [ D1s2 , a randomization over one's set s of pure strategies, let s 1m, f 2 denote the probability assigned to the pure strategy s 5 1m, f 2.
9 Define the payoff function v : s 2 S R, 6 Drift in equilibrium components of games is analyzed in detail in Kenneth Binmore and Larry Samuelson (99, 997) ; see also Itzhak Gilboa and Akihiko Matsui (99) for the related concept of cyclically stable sets.
7 Note that it is not clear what actions two persons who send this conditional statement will take. However, this would have been clear had they both sent the following message: "I will take action a if you send this message also."
8 It is technically inessential that each player condition his action upon his own message (he knows what message he has sent). However, this formalization simplifies the notation. 9 Technically, D(s) is thus the unit simplex of probability distributions over s. Recall that mixed strategies have two distinct interpretations in game theory. In the epistemic interpretation (Aumann and Adam Brandenburger 995), a mixed strategy represents another player's uncertainty about the player's behavior. In the mass action interpretation (John Nash 950), there is a population associated with each player role in the game, and a mixed strategy represents a population frequency of deterministic behaviors. thE AmERicAN EcONOmic REViEW in G 5 1s, v2 by letting v 3 1m, f 2 , 1m9, g2 4 be the payoff p 3 f 1m, m92 , g 1m9, m 2 4 to a player who takes the action f 1m, m92 against action g 1m, m92 in the underlying game g. We extend the pure-strategy payoff function v linearly to mixed strategies in G as usual.
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Having defined the cheap-talk game G 5 1s, v2 , let b : D1s2 S S D1s2 be the best-reply correspondence in G. This correspondence specifies, for each (pure or mixed) strategy s9 [ D1s2 that one's opponent may play, the (nonempty) set b 1s92 , D1s2 of optimal (pure and mixed) strategies to use. Let
be the set of fixed points under b: the set of (pure and mixed) strategies in the cheap-talk game that are best replies to themselves. In other words, D NE is the set of pure and mixed strategies used in symmetric Nash equilibria in G.
We are now in a position to define lexicographic communication games. The messages, actions, and strategies in such a game G are defined as in G, with g denoting the underlying game. We proceed to define G as an ordinal game, that is, a game in which players have complete and transitive preference orderings over mixed-strategy profiles (see Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein 99, chap. 2) . Messages in G have a predetermined meaning in the sense that to send any message m [ m "means" that one intends to take some action in a subset of A that depends on m and that may also depend on the message m9 received. Let this subset be denoted m 1m, m92. We call such a correspondence m : m 2 S S A, mapping message pairs to subsets of actions, a meaning correspondence.
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Players have a lexicographic preference for honesty, defined as follows. Let h : m 2 3 A S R 1 be the "honesty cost" (psychological and/or social discomfort) of sending message m and taking action a, having received message m9, where h 1m, m9, a 2 5 0 if and only if a [ m 1m, m92; that is, to take actions in accordance with the common language has zero honesty cost, while all other behaviors have positive honesty cost.
3 Define the second-order payoff function w : s 2 S R by setting w 3 1m, f 2 , 1m9, g2 4 5 2 h 3m, m9, f 1m, m92 4 . The function value w 3 1m, f 2 , 1m9, g2 4 # 0 is the second-order utility arising from potentially being dishonest when using pure strategy 1m, f 2 [ s when the other player uses pure strategy 1m9, g2 [ s, as, for example, when first saying that one will take a certain action a and then not doing so. With some abuse of notation, let w 1s, s92 be the linear extension of w to mixed strategies, hence representing the expected value of w for a player who uses the mixed strategy s when the other uses s9. Let f L define the lexicographic 0 This is done as follows: multiply each pure-strategy payoff v 3 1m, f 2 , 1m9, g2 4 by the probabilities s 1m, f 2 and s91m9, g2 attached to the pure strategies involved, and take the sum all these products.
Although this does not follow from predicate logic, we conjecture that a vast majority of English-speaking persons would understand m * to also satisfy m 1m
. 2 Usually, correspondences are taken to be nonempty valued. However, since there are statements that are dishonest irrespective of the actions taken (for example: "I am a violinist" if uttered by either of the authors), we allow for the possibility that m 1m, m92 5 [ for some m, m9 [ m. However, by requiring all messages in the set m to be either honest or dishonest, we exclude from the set m such messages as "This message is dishonest," which, arguably, is neither honest nor dishonest.
3 Individuals may differ as to their honesty costs. The key assumption is that they have a common meaning correspondence.
order on R 2 , defined as usual: 1x , x 2 2 f L 1y , y 2 2 if x . y or x 5 y and x 2 $ y 2 . Each player's utility vector, when the own strategy is s and the other's is s9, is defined as
The preferences of the players in G are defined as the lexicographic ordering of these utility vectors. In other words: each player prefers one strategy profile over another if the first profile's utility vector is lexicographically ranked before the other's,
where s, t [ D1s2 are the player's own strategies and s9, t9 [ D1s2 those of the other player. Material payoffs are thus ranked first and honesty payoffs second. One strategy profile is thus strictly preferred over another if and only if either (i) the expected payoff from the interaction in the underlying game g is higher under the first profile, or (ii) there is an exact tie between those expected payoffs but the expected dishonesty cost is lower under the first profile. This defines G 5 1s, f2 as an ordinal game.
In other words, a (pure or) mixed strategy s is a best reply in G against the pure or mixed strategy s9 if and only if there is no other pure or mixed strategy t that results in either a higher expected material payoff or exactly the same material payoff but a lower expected honesty cost. Accordingly, a Nash equilibrium of G is a strategy profile 1s, s92 such that s [ b 1s92 and s9 [ b 1s2. Such an equilibrium is symmetric if s 5 s9. The set of strategies used in symmetric Nash equilibria of G will be denoted
This is the set of (pure and) mixed strategies that are best replies to themselves in the lexicographic communication game. The following two axioms for the meaning correspondence turn out to be important and will be explicitly invoked when assumed: In other words, Axiom P requires the message set m to contain at least one message for each action in the underlying g such that the action is exactly specified. To send such a message and then take another action violates the common understanding of the language, irrespective of the message sent by the other player. Such a message could take the form "I will take action a 
II. Nash Equilibrium
It follows from the definition of the best-reply correspondence b that a mixed-strategy profile 1s, s2 is a Nash equilibrium of G if and only if (i) it is a Nash equilibrium of G, (ii) all strategies in the support of s have the same expected cost of dishonesty, and (iii) there is no other pure strategy that earns the same material payoff against s and has a lower expected dishonesty cost. Formally (and with a slight abuse of notation):
for all 1m, f 2 [ s and all 1m9, g2 [ supp 1s2.
As an immediate corollary we obtain that if 1s, s2 is a Nash equilibrium of G in which a null message is used with positive probability, then w 1s, s2 5 0. We call such Nash equilibria honesty equilibria. By contrast, a symmetric Nash equilibrium 1s, s2 of G is a dishonesty equilibrium if w 1s, s2 , 0. The following example exhibits a dishonesty equilibrium. Next, we consider the opposite possibility, discussed in Aumann (990), namely, that people may say "c" when they actually intend to play d in the game g in (). Such behavior, while compatible with Nash equilibrium under cheap talk, is incompatible with Nash equilibrium in any language in which (i) saying "c" is dishonest when followed by play of d, and (ii) there is a message that is honest to send in conjunction with taking action d. More precisely, to send the message "c" with positive probability and then play the Nash equilibrium 1d, d 2 of g in the preceding example is incompatible with Nash equilibrium in the lexicographic communication game.
Likewise, Matthew Rabin (99) (see Section IV), defines completeness of a pre-play communication language to essentially mean that in the pre-play negotiation stage in his model, players are able to specify any equilibrium they want to suggest (Rabin 99, Definition 2). 5 The message "c" could, for example, be "I will take action c" or "Let us play c." We now explore the implications of Axioms P and N. First, if the language contains a null message, then any symmetric Nash equilibrium of an underlying game g can be implemented in Nash equilibrium in G by simply having both players send a null message ("promise nothing") and play the symmetric Nash equilibrium of g irrespective of the message received from the other player. In particular, the payoff dominated equilibrium 1d, d 2 in the game in () is consistent with Nash equilibrium in G . Denoting mixed strategies in g by r [ D1A2 , with r 1a 2 for the probability assigned to action a [ A, we have:
LEMMA 2: Let 1r, r 2 be a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric two-player game g and suppose that G satisfies axiom N. then there exists a symmetric honesty equilibrium of G in which each action a [ A is played with probability r 1 a 2 .
Second, if g is a coordination game with at least two actions, then every symmetric Nash equilibrium in the associated lexicographic communication game has a message that is not sent in equilibrium if axioms P and N are met. More precisely, we call a finite and symmetric n 3 ngame g a (pure) coordination game if the payoff matrix P satisfies p 1i, i 2 . p 1 j, i 2 5i, j Z i. In other words, each (pure) action is its own unique best reply. A message m [ m is unsent under a mixed strategy s [ D1s2 if no pure strategy in the support of s uses m.
LEMMA 3: Let G be a lexicographic communication game that satisfies Axioms P and N, and where g is an n 3 n-coordination game with n $ 2. Every s [ D NE has at least one unsent message.
The following example shows that there are dishonest equilibria in some games even under the hypotheses of Lemma 3. It is as if two friends are joking with each other. They both say "let us meet at the bad restaurant" although they understand that the other actually plans to go to the good restaurant. A deviation from this joke would bewilder the other and induce him or her to indeed go to the bad restaurant. This example and Lemma 3 together show that, although a lexicographic preference for honesty does not rule out the possibility of lying equilibria, it restricts the sets of messages sent in equilibrium. In particular, it rules out so-called babbling equilibria, that is, equilibria in cheap-thE AmERicAN EcONOmic REViEW talk games in which all messages are sent and "nobody listens" (actions are not conditioned on messages). This property is crucial for our main result.
The structure of the sets of Nash equilibria, in g and G respectively, are as follows. The cheap-talk game G is finite, so its Nash equilibria form a finite disjoint union of closed and connected semialgebraic sets, the Nash equilibrium components of G. 
III. Evolutionary Stability
The concept of neutral stability (John Maynard Smith 982) is a weakening of evolutionary stability: instead of requiring that any mutant strategy do strictly worse in the postmutation population (granted its population share is small enough), it is required that no mutant do strictly better in the postmutation population (under the same proviso). Neutral stability is thus similar in spirit to Nash equilibrium; no small group of individuals in a large community can do better by together deviating to another strategy when the rest of the community plays the original strategy. 8 We here apply this concept to the material payoffs in lexicographic communication games or, equivalently, to the cheap-talk game associated with any given lexicographic communication game.
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Formally, given a lexicographic communication game G :
6 This set is a projection of the intersection between the set of Nash equilibria in g and the diagonal of the space of mixed-strategy profiles. It is non-empty by Kakutani's Fixed-Point theorem applied to b (see Weibull 995) . 7 In fact, honesty and closedness are strongly related properties: if axiom N holds and the game is not trivial, then components are closed if and only if they do not contain lying equilibria. The proof of this fact, which is not needed in the sequel, is available upon request from the authors. 8 In the case of evolutionary, as opposed to neutral, stability, such groups do strictly worse-a parallel to strict Nash equilibrium.
9 Similar results are obtained if one includes honesty costs and applies evolutionary stability to the full lexicographic payoff structure.
In other words, a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) is a strategy s that is a best reply to itself and, in case of multiple best replies, fares at least as well against other best replies t, as these fare against themselves. 20 
Applied to a singleton set 5s6, this definition is identical with Maynard Smith's (982) definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) s. Not surprisingly, evolutionarily stable sets thus have most of the properties of evolutionarily stable strategies. In particular, just as an ESS, viewed as a population state, is asymptotic stable in the replicator dynamic (Peter Taylor and L. Jonker 978), an evolutionarily stable set is set-wise asymptotically stable in the same dynamic (Thomas 985; Weibull 995) . More precisely, if we view the probabilities assigned by a mixed strategy s to pure strategies s 5 1m, f 2 as population shares, in a population where individuals now and then are randomly pairwise matched to play the game G , and if pure strategies that on average give higher material payoffs spread faster in the population than those that on average give lower material payoffs, then no small perturbation of a population state s in, or near, an evolutionarily stable set X will lead the population state far away from X. Indeed, the population state will in the long run be arbitrarily close to, or in, the set X.
2 In this sense, (setwise and pointwise) evolutionary stability implies asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamic. It is also known that a neutrally stable strategy s, again viewed as a population state, is weakly dynamically stable (or Lyapunov stable) in the replicator dynamic (Immanuel M. Bomze and Weibull 995) . It is easily verified that this also holds for any neutrally stable set. 22 Hence, no small perturbation of a neutrally stable population state, or a population state in or near a closed set of such states, will lead the population state far away.
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Let g be a finite and symmetric coordination game with a unique payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium 1c, c 2 , resulting in payoff a to each player.
2 For any real number b, call b a (material) 20 To see that this is equivalent to the given verbal condition above concerning post-mutation populations, note that, since v is linear in each of its two arguments, neutral stability is equivalent with requiring that for all t : v(t, ( 2 e)s 1 et) # v(s, ( 2 e) s 1 et), for all e . 0 small enough. While the proof given in the Appendix is somewhat lengthy and technical, its intuition is simple. The most important claim is the instability of components X of D NE that do not result in the maximal material payoff. Let X be such and suppose that s belongs to X. By Lemma 3, there exists a message m that is not sent by s. The population may drift in the component X toward strategies s9 that do not "punish" senders of m, and earn the same material payoff as s (against s and itself). This leaves the door open for mutants who use the message m as a "secret handshake" among themselves. They earn the same material payoff against s9 as the nonmutants do. By playing the action-pair 1c, c 2 when meeting each other, however, they earn more in such encounters and thus also on average. The two parts of the argument, "drift to nonpunishing strategies" and "secret handshake," are illustrated in the following two examples: 
IV. Sender-Receiver Games
We here briefly discuss how our approach can be extended to games with one-sided communication-so-called sender-receiver games-and what results the approach yields. Intuitively, one would expect one-sided communication to be beneficial for the sender, who arguably can lead play toward any preferred Nash equilibrium in the underlying game g. This intuition turns out to be roughly, though not entirely, right.
Let g be a finite, not necessarily symmetric, two-player game with player roles S and R and with action set A for player S and action set B for player R. Let the payoffs to the pure-strategy pair 1a, b 2 [ A 3 B be p s 1a, b 2 and p R 1a, b 2. Define a cheap-talk sender-receiver game H, based on g, as follows. Before g is played, S sends a message m from a finite set m. Player R receives this message and thereafter both players simultaneously take their actions, a [ A and b [ B, respectively, in game g. Hence, in H a pure strategy for the sender is a pair 1m, a 2 [ m 3 A and, for the receiver, a function g : m S B that maps received messages to own actions. Play of such a pure-strategy pair in H results in actions a and b 5 g 1m 2 [ B in g. The payoffs in H are the resulting payoffs in the underlying game g, to be called the material payoffs.
We introduce meaning of messages in a similar way as in games with two-sided communication, and thereby obtain a game H with one-sided communication. More specifically, for each message m [ m, let m 1m 2 be a subset of the sender's action set A. The elements of m 1m 2 are those actions that message m means that the sender intends to play. This defines the meaning correspondence m : m S S A in H . Let h : m 3 A S R 1 be an function such that h 1m, a 2 5 0 if and only if a [ m 1m 2; this is the sender's honesty cost function. Define the sender's lexicographic preferences in H along the same lines as in games with two-sided communication, and let the receiver's preferences in H simply be defined by this player's material payoffs. This defines H as a lexicographic sender-receiver game. Now define H -as the symmetric lexicographic communication game that is obtained from H by adding a first random draw by "nature," whereby one of the players in H -becomes the sender and the other the receiver in H , with equal probability for both draws. Both players in the symmetric game H -thus have a lexicographic preference for honesty, a preference that matters only if the player happens to be drawn to be the sender. Consider lexicographic communication games H -satisfying axioms P and N. 25 For each mixedstrategy profile 1s, t2 , denote by v s 1s, t2 and v R 1s, t2 the conditionally expected material payoffs to the player who plays s, conditional upon the event that this player is drawn to be the sender and receiver, respectively. Thus,
is the expected material payoff to strategy s in H -when played against t. Let b -be the best-reply correspondence in H -and let D -NE be its set of fixed points. Again, this set consists of finitely many connected components. We establish the claimed results for a class of games g that contain those considered in Proposition -symmetric coordination games with a unique payoff dominant Nash equilibrium. Generalizing the notation in the preceding section somewhat, let a s denote the maximal payoff in g to player role S, (9) a s 5 max p s 1a, b 2. Consider games g in which the maximum payoff a s to player role S is achieved in only one action pair, 1a * , b * 2 , and, moreover, this action pair is a strict Nash equilibrium of g. We call such games strict. In such a game, a message suggesting play of 1a * , b * 2 is self-committing in the sense that a sender believing that the receiver believes the message has an incentive to carry out her action, a * . Such a message need not, however, be self-signaling, where self-signaling means that the sender prefers the receiver to believe the message only if she plans to carry out her action. Aumann's example shows that strictness does not imply this property. Clearly, all symmetric coordination games with a unique payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium are strict in this sense, as are all games of the battle-of-the-sexes and hawk-dove varieties (while prisoner's dilemma games are not). One would guess that, when the underlying game is strict, it would be evolutionarily advantageous to "declare to be tough" and then play a * when in the sender role, and to be accommodating and play b * in the receiver role. The following proposition formalizes this intuition.
PROPOSITION 2: Let g be strict and let H -be a symmetric lexicographic communication game, based on g, that satisfies axioms P and N. A component X of D -NE is neutrally stable if and only if it results in the maximal sender-payoff a s . moreover, this is the unique evolutionarily stable equilibrium sender-outcome.
The intuition for the proof (in the Appendix) is as follows. First, in a Nash equilibrium there is always an unused message, as in the case of two-sided communication. Second, the population may drift, within the component, toward a strategy that does not "punish" senders of the unused message. Third, if such a "forgiving" strategy does not induce the maximal sender-payoff, this leaves the door open for mutants who "get their way" as senders and accommodate optimally as receivers. Such mutants earn on average a higher material payoff than the rest of the population.
Unlike in the case of two-sided communication, the unique evolutionary stable outcome need not be ex ante Pareto efficient. To see this, let g be the following skewed battle-of-the-sexes game: . This game has two strict Nash equilibria, one better for the row player, the other better for the column player, both Pareto efficient in the game g, but the latter giving the highest average payoff, . The game g is clearly strict, with a s 5 3. Hence, in a lexicographic and symmetrized communication game H -satisfying axioms P and N, the unique evolutionarily stable set results in play of the strict equilibrium 1c, c 2 preferred by the player in the sender role, although the associated expected material payoff in H -is only two, while always sending a null message and taking action d is another Nash equilibrium of H -and results in the higher expected material payoff four.
Why cannot a few mutants playing 1d, d 2 with each other invade a population playing 1c, c 2? The point is that, even if such mutants would appear and start sending an unused message (in order 26 The conclusions are valid under less stringent, but more involved, assumptions on g than strictness.
to recognize each other), and even if the rest of the population would not punish senders of this message, the mutant in the sender role has no way to know whether the receiver is a mutant or not, where the latter is much more likely. So a mutant sender essentially has to presume that the receiver is a nonmutant and will therefore have no way to be "nicer" to a receiving mutant. By contrast, under two-sided communication, two mutants, both sending an unused message, can recognize each other and thereby coordinate their actions on a better equilibrium in the underlying game.
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V. Related Work
Intuition and experiments suggest that pairs of individuals are usually able to achieve efficiency in coordination games when they are allowed to communicate before play. Moreover, the ability to coordinate seems to be greater the closer to a natural language the experimental communication protocol is (see Kathleen Valley et al. 2002; Charness and Martin Dufwenberg 2006 ). Here we model a shared language, along with the cultural conventions in its use, by way of a meaning correspondence. In this we differ from the cheap-talk literature and from other models of pre-play communication. This section briefly comments on some of the most closely related work, in chronological order.
Joseph Farrell (988, 993) analyzes costless pre-play communication when messages have a preexisting meaning. Unlike here, players have no preference for honesty per se. Instead, Farrell imposes a credibility condition, roughly requiring the listener to believe the speaker unless the speaker could have a "strategic reason" to mislead the listener. Credibility is a property of a message (and may depend on the game in question), while we model honesty as a property of a triplet-a message-pair and an action-and assume that players have a deontological preference for this property.
Roger B. Myerson (989) develops a formal credibility criterion for one-sided communication games, assuming that messages have a preexisting meaning. Applied to games of complete information, Myerson's criterion essentially requires that if the sender promises to take a certain action and recommends the others to take some actions, the so-defined action-profile should constitute a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. Players do not have deontological preferences for honesty or the truth.
As mentioned in the introduction, Robson (990) pioneered the idea of using unsent messages as "secret handshakes" among mutants (see also Karl Wärneryd 99) . Using a similar argument, Sobel (993) establishes a form of dynamic evolutionary stability of efficient outcomes in coordination games preceded by two-sided cheap talk. He defines a population dynamic with a finite population for each player role in a two-player game. Pairs of individuals, one from each player population, are randomly matched to play the game and all individuals play pure strategies. Sobel assumes that there are more messages than individuals in each player population, so there always exists at least one unsent message. Evolutionary drift may lead to a population state in which the unsent message in question is not "punished." If, in a coordination game, the average population payoff is not maximal, this opens the door for mutants to destabilize the population state by way of sending the unsent message and playing the "good" Nash equilibrium among themselves.
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27 The line of reasoning in this section also applies to cheap-talk games, at the expense of introducing one more round of evolutionary drift in order to create an unused message. In that setting, our result essentially replicates Proposition in Yong-Gwan Kim and Joel Sobel (995) . 28 As shown by Schlag (993, 99) , Wärneryd (998) , and Abhijit Banerjee and Weibull (993, 2000) , this argument does not apply if individuals are allowed to play mixed strategies and the game in question is played by individuals thE AmERicAN EcONOmic REViEW Sobel's (993) model is further developed in Kim and Sobel (995) , and they also consider sender-receiver games. As pointed out earlier, our result for this case confirms theirs, the only difference being that our approach requires one less round of evolutionary drift. This suggests the possibility that honesty costs might induce faster convergence to the equilibrium preferred by the sender.
Rabin (99) analyzes two-sided pre-play communication in symmetric two-player games. He considers costless communication in a language with pre-existing meaning, and players make repeated simultaneous proposals before playing the underlying game. If all players propose the same equilibrium in a given pre-play communication round, then this is taken to be an agreement to play that equilibrium. Our approaches differ, since in Rabin's model players do not have honesty preferences, and in our model two identical messages are not taken to necessarily constitute an agreement.
Blume (998) studies a stochastic population dynamic for pre-play communication games in which some messages have a priori meaning. Namely, for each strict equilibrium in the underlying game, each player has exactly one message "linked" to that equilibrium. If such a linked message is sent, then the receiver of the message obtains a small increase in his or her material payoff when playing according to that equilibrium, while the sender's payoff is unaffected. By contrast, we assume that it is the sender who may incur a lexicographic payoff loss, while the receiver's payoff does not depend directly on the message received. Hurkens and Karl H. Schlag (2002) analyze cheap talk pre-play communication in situations where each player has the option of not showing up at the pre-play communication stage, that is, of not sending a message and not knowing if the other player has sent a message. By contrast, while our null axiom permits senders to avoid "committing" to any particular action, receivers in our model cannot commit to not observe the other's message. Hurkens and Schlag show that in their setting the unique evolutionarily stable set in n 3 n-coordination games is characterized by play of the payoff dominant equilibrium. Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) develop a sender-receiver model of the Crawford and Sobel (982) variety and use this to analyze strategic misrepresentation of private information. The sender knows the true state and incurs a disutility from misrepresenting his private information. The message space is identical with the state space, and this is an unbounded interval. The sender's utility function is decreasing in his message's deviation from the truth. Receivers have a small probability of being credulous. See Ying Chen (200), Kartik (2005) , and Chen, Kartik, and Sobel (2008) for more research on this topic.
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Pei-yu Lo (2007) develops an alternative model of language, meaning, and games. She focuses on sender-receiver games and formalizes meaning by way of restricting the receiver's reactions to messages. Her solution concept is iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. In battle-of-the-sexes games, the sender obtains her preferred outcome, as in our model in Section IV. However, in Aumann's example (), all outcomes are possible, in sharp contrast with our model.
VI. Concluding Comments
An interesting feature of evolutionary stability in pre-play communication games is its logical independence of ordinality in the underlying game, where by ordinality we mean invariance drawn from one and the same population. In particular, there exists an evolutionarily stable outcome in 2 3 2 coordination games that sends all messages and results in suboptimal payoffs. 29 For other analyses of deceit and lying, see Sobel (985) 30 A more profound question, falling outside the scope of this study, is whether ordinality should, indeed, be viewed as a general desideratum for solution concepts in games.
We plan to extend our analysis in different directions, first by applying this approach to repeated games. Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin (990) showed that evolutionary stability and noise, together, have strong efficiency implications in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas. If, instead of noise, the players communicate with each other between rounds, will this destabilize inefficient outcomes? We also intend to study the evolution of meaning and honesty of language in populations using cheap talk.
Appendix
This section contains mathematical proofs of results not proved in the main text.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
Consider a mixed strategy s [ D1s2 such that every message m [ m is sent with positive probability in s. By Axiom N, the language contains a null message. Let n be such a message. Since n is used in s, no pure strategy 1m, f 2 in the support of s is dishonest against s, by Lemma . By hypothesis, the game g contains at least two actions, say c and d. By Axiom P there exist messages "c","d " [ m such that m 1"c", · 2 ; 5c 6 and m 1"d", · 2 ; 5d 6. Since, by hypothesis, every message is sent in s, the message pair 1"c","d "2 is realized with positive probability. Since no strategy is dishonest against s, the player who sent "c" has to play c, but this is not a best reply to the action of the other player, who plays d (since she sent "d "). Hence, s o b 1s2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION :
First, we prove that a component X of D NE is not neutrally stable if it contains a strategy s with v 1s, s2 , a.
Since s [ D NE and axioms N and P hold, Proposition 3 implies that there exists at least one message that is not sent in s. Let n [ m be such. Choose a pure strategy s [ supp 1s2 such that v 1s, s2 , a and let s 5 1m , f˜2. For each pure strategy s 5 1m, f 2 [ supp 1s2 , let s be the associated modified pure strategy 1m, f 2 , where f 1m, m92 5 f 1m, m92 for all m9 Z n and f 1m, n 2 5 f 1m, m 2. Note that s reacts to receiving n just as s reacts to m , while otherwise they coincide. If s 5 g l i s i for pure strategies s i and probability weights l i . 0 summing to , let s 5 g l i s i . In other words, s is the same convex combination of the pure strategies s i as s is with respect to the s i . For all 0 # t # , define s t 5 12t 2 s 1 ts . Note that s and s t send the same messages and react in the same way to the messages they send: they differ only in their reaction to 0 , s2 5 v 1s, s2 , then we must have w 1s 0 , s2 # w 1s, s2 because s is a lexicographic NE. However, we also have w 1s 0 , s 2 5 w 1s 0 , s2 because, again, s and s send the same messages, so w 1s 0 , s 2 5 w 1s 0 , s2 # w 1s, s2 5 w 1s
, s
2.
Again, by linearity in t, we are done. This proves the claim. Consider now the pure "secret handshake" strategy ŝ 5 1n, g2 , where g 1n, m92 5 f˜1m , m92 if m9 Z n and g 1n, n 2 5 c. We then have v 1ŝ, s Second, we prove that a is the unique evolutionarily stable equilibrium outcome. For any s [ X 1a 2 and t [ D1s2 , v 1t, s2 # a 5 v 1s, s2 , so condition (i) in the definition of neutral stability holds. If v 1t, s2 5 v 1s, s2 , then t must always play c against s, so v 1s, t2 5 a $ v 1t, t2 and thus condition (ii) in the definition of neutral stability also holds. In sum: X 1a 2 , D Nss . We note that X 1a 2 is nonempty (send any null message and react to all messages by taking action c ) and that it is closed by continuity of v. It thus remains to verify only that if v 1s, s2 5 a, v 1t, s2 5 v 1s, s2 , and v 1t, t2 5 v 1s, t2 , then also v 1t, t2 5 a. But this follows from the observation above that v 1s, t2 5 a.
Third, it remains to prove that a component X of D NE is neutrally stable if it results in material payoff a. This follows directly, however, from the fact just proven that a is an evolutionarily stable equilibrium outcome, which implies that any subset of X 1a 2 consists of neutrally stable strategies.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
We first prove that a component X of D -NE is not neutrally stable if it contains some strategy s such that v s 1s, s2 , a s . Let s [ X. Using the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, it is not difficult to show that there exists a message m [ m such that s assigns zero probability to all pure strategies using m. We define s in a similar way as in the proof of Proposition : in the sender role, s sends the same messages and takes the same actions as s. In the receiver role, s reacts to all 3 Note that, if s is in a dishonest component, s does not necessarily belong to D NE because we could have v 1 1n, h 2 , s2 , v 1s, s2 , v 1 1n, h 2 , s 2 5 v 1s
, s 2 and w 1 1n, h 2 , s
. w 1s
, s 2; see Example .
